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Robert Nozick on nonhuman animals: 
Rights, value and the meaning of life 
 
Josh Milburn1 
 
This paper is a version of a chapter forthcoming/published in the Palgrave Macmillan 
volume Ethical and Political Approaches to Nonhuman Animal Issues, edited by 
Andrew Woodhall and Gabriel Garmendia da Trindade. It may differ slightly from the 
final version. 
 
 
It has been widely noted that the political turn in animal ethics has been broadly liberal in 
character (e.g., Milburn 2016; Milligan 2015; Wissenburg 2014), with the key texts (e.g., 
Donaldson and Kymlicka 2013; Garner 2013; Nussbaum 2006) all drawing, primarily and 
explicitly, from liberal political philosophy. Though this focus is understandable, 
contemporary political theory does not begin and end with liberalism, and the political turn 
will be intellectually impoverished if it is unable or unwilling to engage with other strands of 
political philosophy. One way to contribute to widening our understanding of the place of 
nonhuman animals (NHAs) in political theory is by looking to right libertarian (hereafter, 
libertarian) thought. Animal ethicists might be excused for assuming that libertarian 
philosophy has nothing to offer progressive thought on NHAs, as, regrettably, prominent 
libertarian theorists have traditionally been vocal critics of animal rights. For example, Tibor 
Machan (e.g., 1985; 1991; 2004), Loren Lomasky (e.g., 1987, 221-7; 2013) and especially 
Jan Narveson (e.g., 1977; 1987; 1999) have written in no uncertain terms about their 
opposition to prominent animal ethicists, their support for meat-eating or their conviction that 
NHAs are not rights-bearers. This is regrettable, not least because it serves to obscure the 
views of Robert Nozick, the foremost libertarian political philosopher, who was ± especially 
when compared with some of his intellectual descendants ± remarkably open to strong 
normative obligations towards NHAs. 
Nozick, the author of the widely-read Anarchy, State and Utopia (hereafter, ASU) 
(1974), is often cited as the most important political philosopher of the 20th century other than 
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John Rawls. For this reason alone, the absence of sustained consideration of the place of 
1+$VLQ1R]LFN¶VSKLORVRSK\is striking. Further, Nozick wrote a considerable amount about 
NHAs. Rawls wrote little about the topic, but a wide literature has arisen exploring the place 
of NHAs in his thought. Indeed, Nozick suggests that we owe a much to NHAs ± he was (at 
least) a vegetarian (Nozick 1981, 523), and many of his arguments seem to lend themselves 
fairly straightforwardly to veganism. The absence of Nozick in the animal ethics literature is 
mirrored by an absence of animal ethics in the Nozick literature; among commentators, 
1R]LFN¶V thoughts on NHAs are put aside as a tangential consideration which cannot be 
pursued (Arneson 2011, 18; Bader 2010, 13; Lacey 2001, 28; Nagel 1981, 203; Wolff 2003, 
2-3), or even decried as a waste of space (Johnson 1976, 182). 
In this chapter, I will begin to correct this gap in the literature by closely examining 
the place of NHAs LQ1R]LFN¶VWKRXJKW. In addition, I will offer indications of how this ties to 
the broader question of NHAs in libertarian thought. Typically of Nozick, it is hard to find a 
single position on NHAs; however, given that consideration of NHAs can be found variously 
in his politics, his ethics and his axiology, this is perhaps understandable. I will begin by 
addressing the idea that Nozick was simply a speciesist, before outlining what I will suggest 
is the most straightforward reading of Nozick on NHAs ± namely, that our obligations to 
NHAs are relegated to the moral sphere from the political sphere. Nonetheless, I will suggest 
that tensions in this position indicate that Nozick may have been more open to animal rights 
than has been previously appreciated. I will close by looking to 1R]LFN¶VD[LRORJ\DQGHWKLFV, 
showing how Nozick argues that NHAs are beings valuable in-and-of-themselves and that we 
have strong moral obligations towards them, whatever our political obligations. 
 
Nozick and speciesism 
One way that Nozick has been addressed in the animal ethics literature is as a straightforward 
speciesist (Dombrowski 1997, 157-75; McMahan 2002, 218; Rachels 1990, 183-4). This 
view is based on his UHYLHZRI7RP5HJDQ¶VThe Case for Animal Rights (1983) written for 
the New York Times Book Review (1983) and later republished in his Socratic Puzzles (1997). 
A typical reading of this piece would suggest that Nozick dismisses 5HJDQ¶VDUJXPHQWVon 
the grounds that we can ignore the problems raised by the argument from species overlap2 
(Pluhar 1995, 71), and that, instead, we can merely DVVXPH WKDW ³WKH VSHFLHV DQ LQGLYLGXDO
EHORQJV WR >LV@ PRUDOO\ UHOHYDQW´ 1R]LFN   $UJXPHQWV IRU WKLV DUH WKLQ 1R]LFN
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 TKLV KDV EHHQ FDOOHG WKH ³DUJXPHQW IURP PDUJLQDO FDVHV´ 7KLV ODWWHU QDPH LV DFWXDOO\ RZHG XOWLPDWHO\ WR
Narveson ± a libertarian critic of animal rights ± but is problematic for a number of reasons (cf. Horta 2014). 
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asserts that species membershiSLVQRW³RQVXUIDFHEODWDQWO\LUUHOHYDQWPRUDOO\´
ZRQGHULQJZKHWKHU³WKHEDUHVSHFLHVFKDUDFWHULVWLFRIVLPSO\EHLQJKXPDQ«ZLOOFRPPDQG
VSHFLDO UHVSHFW RQO\ IURP RWKHU KXPDQV´ DV ³DQ LQVWDQFH RI WKH JHQHUDO SULQFLSOH WKDW WKH
members of aQ\ VSHFLHV PD\ OHJLWLPDWHO\ JLYH WKHLU IHOORZV PRUH ZHLJKW´ WKDQ D ³QHXWUDO
YLHZ ZRXOG JLYH WKHP´   $ VHFRQG VXJJHVWLRQ LV WKDW ZH YLHZ ± this is a 
descriptive claim, not a normative one ± KXPDQVDQG1+$VDJDLQVW³DGLIIHUHQWEDFNJURXQG
and textXUH´DQGWKDWWKHVHEDFNJURXQGVDUH³WZRULFKWDSHVWULHVRQHULFKHUWKDQ
WKH RWKHU´   ,W LV WKH WRWDO GLIIHUHQFH, Nozick suggests, between these rich 
tapestries which justifies a difference in treatment. 
These arguments in support of speciesism are poor, and Nozick recognises this (1997, 
309), but suggests that anti-speciesist philosophers will nonetheless not be taken seriously 
(1997, 309) ± again, a descriptive claim. While we might GLVPLVV 1R]LFN¶V DUJXPHQWV DV
weak, it could be that speciesism is something common to libertarian positions. Machan, for 
instance, is avowedly and clearly speciesist (1991, 170; 2002, 9-14; 2004, 25-54), even if he 
has a rather idiosyncratic account of speciesism, seemingly understanding non-speciesism as 
a kind ecological or environmental ethic (2004, 2). Meanwhile, Narveson, to his credit, 
rejects speciesist reasoning (1987, 43). 
1R]LFN¶VFKDOOHQJHWR5HJDQGRHVQRWIRUKLPUHSUHVHQWDQDWWHPSWWRZDVKKLVKDQGV
of animal ethics. He closes his article by saying that ³>W@KHWRSLF´RIWKHWUHDWPHQWRI1+$V
³LV QRW D WULYLDO RU XQLPSRUWDQW RQH´  ). This is not an empty claim, and he 
elsewhere spends considerable time arguing for respectful treatment of NHAs, as will be 
discussed. I suggest WKDW1R]LFN¶VRSSRVLWLRQWR5HJDQLWHSKLORVRSK\LVVLQFHUHEXW WKDWKLV
IRFXVXSRQ5HJDQ¶VDQWL-speciesism is, all things considered, ill-chosen. I say this not least 
because, in the review, Nozick gestures towards an alternative view about the status of NHAs 
which appears to be non-speciesist. HHZULWHVWKDW1+$V³do have some inherent value and 
hence may not be treated any way anyone might please, but their inherent value is not equal 
WRWKDWRISHRSOH´HPSKDVLV1R]LFN
V1RWHWKDWKHKHUHsays people, not humans 
± one need not be a speciesist to endorse this claim, if we understand people as the plural of 
person. In the review, as in his earlier ASU, Nozick is explicitly open to the notion that 
hypothetical extra-terrestrials may be greater-than-persons (1974, 45; 1997, 308), and, 
correspondingly, may warrant different treatment/valuation. He is therefore, no doubt, open 
to the possibility of non-human persons and human non-persons. 
Here, Nozick is gesturing towards a non-speciesist ethic, simply one that is different 
IURP5HJDQ¶V; the valuation of personhood may well be defensible in a way that the valuation 
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of human-ness is not. ,I ZH UHMHFW 1R]LFN¶V FODLPV DERXW VSHFLHV DV LOO-chosen, the review 
indicates that 1R]LFN¶V FRQFHUQ ZLth Regan is with his reliance upon the argument from 
species overlap (Nozick 1997, 306-7), ZLWKKLV³DOODQLPDOVDUHHTXDO´ axiology and with his 
XVHRI³LQKHUHQWYDOXH´ to ground obligations (Nozick 1997, 309-10). In addition, there is an 
implicit worry abouWWKHVL]HRIDVWDWHQHFHVVDU\WRHQIRUFH5HJDQ¶VSLFWXUHRUDSRVW-Regan 
picture (Nozick 1997, 309). 
It is striking that the former three challenges resonate closely with some of the 
criticism levelled at Reganite philosophy in the political turn (though, at the time, they might 
be more easily read as critiques of animal rights tout court) while the latter is a standard 
libertarian worry about animal-rights-respecting states (cf., e.g., Machan 2004, 23). Also 
striking is that Nozick reads Regan as a political VRQRW³PHUHO\´PRUDO thinker. Once we 
ORRN EH\RQG 1R]LFN¶V misdirected ± and, by his own admission, weak ± defence of 
speciesism, we see a subtle and before-its-time critique of Regan which explicitly leaves open 
the possibility of alternative anti-speciesist positions. 
 
Nozick on vegetarianism 
1R]LFN¶VFRPPHQWV LQ WKHUHYLHZFDQEHIUXLWIXOO\FRQWUDVWHGZLWKZKDWKHVD\VLQASU, in 
which NHAs are considered at some length. Nozick presents a series of compelling thought 
experiments to show us that 1+$V³FRXQWIRUVRPHWKLQJ´DQGDIWHU developing 
an account of how respect is owed to NHAs directly and deftly handling some arguments in 
support of meat-HDWLQJ FRQFOXGHV WKDW ³Whe extra benefits Americans today can gain from 
eating animals do not MXVWLI\ GRLQJ LW 6R ZH VKRXOGQ¶W´ (1974, 38). The extent to which 
1R]LFN¶V arguments for universal Western veg(etari)anism3 were radical should not be 
XQGHUHVWLPDWHG1R]LFNZDVZULWLQJLQSULRUWRWKHSXEOLFDWLRQRI3HWHU6LQJHU¶V 1975 
Animal Liberation RU 5HJDQ¶V 1983 The Case for Animal Rights. However, as already 
mentioned, commentators on Nozick have a tendency to dismiss them as an aside of limited 
importance. 
It is as a part of this discussion that Nozick introduces his maxim RI³XWLOLWDULDQLVPIRU
DQLPDOV.DQWLDQLVPIRUSHRSOH´ 4 We should resist taking this as his all-things-
                                                          
3
 Though Nozick writes only about flesh, it is fairly clear that his argument works better as one for veganism 
than vegetarianism, at least insofar as the milk and egg industries inflict death upon NHAs. Indeed, it resembles 
the simple argument for veganism presented by Gary Francione and Anna Charlton (2013). 
4
 Robert Garner characterises this as a succinct statement of the ethic of animal welfare (Garner 2013, 26, 78); 
LQGHHG *DUQHU LV RQH RI WKH IHZ DQLPDO HWKLFLVWV WR ORRN H[SOLFLWO\ WR 1R]LFN¶V SROLWLFDO WKRXJKW RQ 1+$V
though he rejects it as inadequate. 
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considered view of the status of NHAs. He introduces the suggestion as ³WRRPLQLPDO´
39), and almost immediately rejects it. He is clearly worried about the possibility that there 
may be no legal censure of violence towards NHAs (1974, 40-1), which appears to be a 
natural consequence of this view. Ultimately asking LI³XWLOLWDULDQLVPLVDWOHDVWDGHTXDWHIRU
DQLPDOV´ KH GHFODUHV WKDW KH ³WKLQN>V@ QRW´ (1974, 42) ³(YHQ IRU DQLPDOV´ KH H[SODLQV
³XWLOLWDULDQLVP ZRQ¶W GR DV WKH ZKROH VWRU\ EXW WKH WKLFNHW RI TXHVWLRQV GDXQWV XV´ (1974, 
42).5 The following can be taken from this initial discussion in ASU: Nozick is of the view 
that NHAVKDYHVRPHGHJUHHRIIRUZDQWRIDEHWWHUWHUP³LQKHUHQW´YDOXH or worth, and this 
means that we have certain duties towards them. In particular, this means that people in 
Western democracies (or, minimally, the United States) are obliged to not eat NHAs. 
Typically, this would be understood as a matter for 1R]LFN¶V moral philosophy, rather than 
his politics; in refusing to extend rights to NHAs, Nozick excludes NHAs from political 
protection. When it comes to 1R]LFN¶V political realm and questions of justice, rights are 
exhaustive ± only they can be demanded or enforced (Nozick 1981, 499, 503; Vallentyne 
2011, 147; Wolff 2003, 22). However, we can see a tension in this relegation of issues 
conceUQLQJ1+$VWRWKH³PRUDO´UHDOP1R]LFN¶VILUVWdiscussion of NHAs takes place in the 
development of his political philosophy, and he is unhappy with the framework he proposes, 
not least because it seems to entail that the state FDQQRWSXQLVK³DQLPDOFUXHOW\´ 
 If Nozick is to defend the possibility that the protection of NHAs is excluded from the 
political domain, he needs some way to separate humans and NHAs. He shows awareness of 
this in ASU, and is not content to rest on species difference. He is also sceptical of many of 
the ideas traditionally offered to separate humans and NHAs ± intellect, self-consciousness, 
moral agency, and so on. ,QVWHDG³>D@QLQWHUYHQLQJYDULDEOHM is needed for which the listed 
traits are individually necessary, perhaps jointly sufficient (at least we should be able to see 
what needs to be added to obtain M), and which has a perspicuous and convincing connection 
to moral constraints on behavior toward someone with M´48-9). M is identified, but 
not adequately explained, as the ability to hold ³DQ RYHUDOO FRQFHSWLRQ´ RI OLIH DQG ³WKH
DELOLW\ WR UHJXODWH DQG JXLGH >RQH¶V@ OLIH LQ DFFRUGDQFH ZLWK VRPH RYHUDOO FRQFHSWLRQ LW
FKRRVHVWRDFFHSW´ (1974, 49). This ability to devise a picture of a whole life, the chance to 
DFWZLWK WKH LQWHQWLRQRI IRUPLQJD OLIHRIRQH¶VFKRRVLQJDQG WKHFRQVHTXHQWSRVVLELOLW\RI
leading D OLIH RI RQH¶V FKRRVLQJ LV RI FHQWUDO LPSRUWDQFH WR 1R]LFN XQGHUJLUGLQJ KLV
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 An idea similar to 1R]LFN¶V³XWLOLWDULDQLVPIRUDQLPDOV.DQWLDQLVPIRUSHRSOH´LV-HII0F0DKDQ¶VWKUHH-tiered 
account of the wrongness of killing (McMahan 2008). If we were to defend 1R]LFN¶V PD[LP 0F0DKDQ¶V
account would be the right place to start. 
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conception of rights. As to why this is so, 1R]LFN³FRQMHFWXUH>V@WKDWWKHDQswer is connected 
ZLWKWKDWHOXVLYHDQGGLIILFXOWQRWLRQWKHPHDQLQJRIOLIH´ (1974, 50). 
 
Grounding rights in the meaning of life 
It might be tempting to dismiss Nozick at this point ± if his exclusion of NHAs from the 
political domain rests upon something as imprecise as the meaning of life, he is truly 
clutching at straws. However, and somewhat untypically, he does offer considerable 
discussion of this topic elsewhere,6 first in Philosophical Explanations (1981, chap. 6), and 
then in The Examined Life (2006).7 In these works, Nozick indicates what he understands the 
meaning of life to be, or, at least, what he considers a meaningful life to be. His account of 
meaning rests partially upon his account of value, which will be addressed later, but can 
nonetheless be understood in the abstract: ³9alue LQYROYHV VRPHWKLQJ¶V EHLQJ LQWHJUDWHG
within its own boundaries, while meaning involves its having some connection beyond these 
ERXQGDULHV´  ; cf. Nozick 1981, 594-5). Nozick applies this specifically to the 
PHDQLQJ RI OLIH ³7KH YDOXH RI D SHUVRQ¶V OLIH DWWDFKHV WR LW ZLWKLQ LWV OLPLWV ZKLOH WKH
meaning of his life attaches to it as centered in WKH ZLGHU YDOXH FRQWH[W EH\RQG LWV OLPLWV´
(1981, 611). 
We can deduce that 1R]LFN¶VVWURQJ negative rights derive from the meaning of life 
because meaningfulness depends upon one freely choosing to interact with items of value 
beyond themselves. This means that rights give us the space we need to make our lives 
meaningful. By contrast, if humans were kept unconscious in vats, their lives would be 
meaningless (though valuable) ± appropriately, Nozick observes that our lives would be 
meaningless if we were merely food for aliens, even if delicious (1981, 586). In order to live 
a meaningful life, one both needs the capacities that allow one to cultivate meaningfulness 
and one needs to exist in conditions in which one is free to practice them; the latter, for 
Nozick, is a world in which strong negative rights are recognised and respected. 
 Assuming that Nozick endorses this possibility, he actually offers a fairly unique 
explanation of the exclusion of NHAs from the political domain. Alone, this indicates that he 
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 In looking beyond ASU, I implicitly reject a now-old-fashioned view that Nozick abandoned libertarianism 
(see, e.g., Hailwood 1996, chaps. 1, 10). He certainly later defended elements of a non-libertarian politics ± 
especially his idea oI ³V\PEROLF XWLOLW\´ (Nozick 1993, chaps. I-III; cf. Nozick 2006, chap. 25) ± but both 
defended something like libertarianism in his last book (2001) and professed to remaining libertarian in his last 
interview (Sanchez 2001). While his thought undeniably developed, to say that he abandoned libertarianism 
ZRXOG EH D PLVWDNH , DOVR SDUWLDOO\ UHMHFW 7KRPDV 1DJHO¶V ZLGHO\-quoted claim that Nozick offers 
³OLEHUWDULDQLVPZLWKRXWIRXQGDWLRQV´1R]LFNGRHVRIIHUDJURXQGLQJIRUKLVULJKWVEXWZHKDYHWR look 
beyond ASU to find it. 
7
 The Examined Life was first published in 1989. 
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should be of interest to animal ethicists. It would be possible to take this account RI1R]LFN¶V
position on NHAs as read. Indeed, the idea that NHAs are excluded from 1R]LFN¶Vpolitical 
domain corresponds with the reading typical among commentators and mirrors the accounts 
of other libertarians. Nonetheless, taking this approach would downplay the existence of 
WHQVLRQVZLWKLQ1R]LFN¶VSROLWLFV I suggest, as an alternative to this reading, that Nozick or 
the Nozickian could endorse animal rights. 
2QHDSSURDFKZRXOGEHWRWDNHDVJLYHQ1R]LFN¶VJURXQGLQJRIULJKWVLQWKHPHDQLQJ
of life but suggest that he was nonetheless wrong to limit rights to humans; something that 
neither Nozick nor his critics seem to consider. Perhaps to the extent that NHAs could freely 
create and sustain links to valuable entities beyond themselves (say, the affection a cow has 
IRUKHUFDOID1+$¶VOLIHFRXOGEHPDGHPHDQLQJIXOE\WKHDFWLRQVRIWKH1+$KHUVHOIMXVW
as human lives can be made meaningful by the actions of the human herself. This would 
PDNHH[WHQGLQJULJKWVWR1+$VZLWKLQ1R]LFN¶VIUDPHZRUN coherent; though perhaps less so 
than paradigmatic adult humans, (at least some) NHAs have potentially meaningful lives, but 
this potential is denied by the way we treat them. Extending rights to NHAs to protect them 
from this treatment would allow them to develop meaningfulness. 
The argument may seem to follow quite easily: Humans require rights to freedom 
from human interference because their lives have potential for meaning, and the rights to 
freedom from interference DOORZWKHPWRSXUVXHWKHLUOLYHV¶PHDQLQJIXOQHVVNHAs also have 
potential for meaning in their lives, and this potential is frequently scuppered by human 
interference. Consequently, they, too, should be granted rights. There is an open question, 
however, concerning the extent to which the potential meaningfulness of NHA lives would 
relate to their ³ability to regulate and guide [their lives] in accordance with some overall 
conception [they choose] WRDFFHSW´ (Nozick 1974, 49). As this element is part, for Nozick, of 
how the meaning of life grounds rights for paradigmatic adults, the observation that NHAs 
might be able to make their lives meaningful cannot be straightforwardly used to ground 
animal rights. Perhaps the Nozickian who wishes to deny that NHAs are rights-bearers would 
say that, even if they have the potential for some level of meaningfulness in their lives, NHAs 
lack the ability to pursue a life of their choosing. This difference might hold some 
importance; even though NHAs have the capacity to cultivate meaningfulness (surely not a 
uniquely human capacity) they lack the capacity which really grounds the importance of 
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human freedom ± or so might say my interlocutor.8 Nonetheless, this approach might allow 
for the possibility of a distinctly Nozickian account of animal rights. 
If I were to pursue the argument with my imaginary interlocutor, she might suggest 
that in order for NHAs to achieve their limited potential for meaningfulness, they need some 
level of protection, but not the kind of freedom to form a full life-plan that humans require. 
Perhaps NHAs would require protection from the infliction of death and suffering, and maybe 
some degree of freedom of movement/association or access to the kinds of space they require 
± the kinds of rights for which contemporary interest-based animal rights theorists argue. But 
maybe we do not need to take this rather curious route to suggest that Nozick was concerned 
with the protection of the key interests of NHAs. Instead, we can see the seed of animal rights 
in NozicN¶VRZQZRUGV5HFDOOKLV uneasiness at the thought that NHAs might be excluded 
from any and all legal protection, and not because of any indirect duty (i.e., a duty to some 
human which concerns the NHA), but because of their own value. Also recall the way that, in 
Nozickian philosophy and libertarian political theory more broadly, rights are exhaustive 
when it comes to questions of justice. If Nozick or the libertarian wishes to extend any 
protection to NHAs, then there is only one option open to them: these NHAs must have 
rights. This is part of what makes Nozickian politics so interesting when it comes to animal 
ethics 7KHUH LV YHU\ OLWWOH ³PLGGOH JURXQG´ concerning the class of rights-bearers or the 
recipients of justice; a given being is either in or out. 
 
Choices and interests 
Part of the reason that it might seem difficult for Nozick ± and libertarians more broadly ± to 
take account of animal rights is the UHOLDQFHXSRQ³FKRLFH´RU³ZLOO´ULJKWV7KHVHDUHULJKWV
instituted to protect the choices or will of the individual. So, for example, a right against 
being sold into slavery is more accurately described as a right over whether one is sold into 
slavery, with Nozick explicitly allowing that an individual may choose to sell herself into 
slavery, if she is so inclined (1974, 331). NHAs seem to lack the capacities for making these 
kinds of choices. 1R]LFN¶VIRFXVRQZLOOULJKWVFDQEHXQGHUVWRRGZKHQKLVULJKWVIUDPHZRUN 
is contextualised within his account of meaning, given that free choice is necessary to live a 
meaningful life. 
                                                          
8
 1R]LFNWHOOVXVWKDW³VRPHSHRSOH´XQGHUVWDQGDPHDQLQJIXOOLIHWREHRQHRUJDQL]HGDFFRUGLQJWRDSODQ
which 2) possesses structure and is 3) lived transparently, so that 4) others can learn from it by 5) seeing as 
positive those features exalted (1981, 578). This seems to assume a level of mental sophistication perhaps 
lacking in all actual NHAs. 
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As 1R]LFN¶VULJKWVDUHZLOOULJKWVDQGas 1+$VDUH³HLWKHULQRURXW´KLVcomments 
about NHAs have troubled those philosophers who have looked to them. Peter Vallentyne, 
though he astutely identifies the relationship between claims, rights and justice in Nozickian 
philosophy (2011, 145- LV SX]]OHG E\ 1R]LFN¶V UHIHUHQFHV WR WKH FODLPV RI 1+$V
assuming that Nozick is making reference to claims that are unenforceable (2011, 166). 
+RZHYHU³FODLPV´OLNH³ULJKWV´KDYHQRSODFHLQ1R]LFN¶VXQHQIRUFHDEOH moral philosophy. 
Alan Lacey is also perplexed by Nozick¶VGLVFXVVLRQRI1+$V+HUHDGV NozicN¶VIRXQGDWLRQ
of rights in a way close to how I have presented it, before attributing faulty reasoning to him: 
 
³>:@e might distinguish that some creature has a right to a certain treatment 
and saying that it is right so to treat and wrong not to. The latter need not 
entail the former. Perhaps something only has a right if it is capable of 
recognizing rights in general, both its own and those of others; infants have 
rights in virtue of what they will become later[.]´ (Lacey 2001, 28) 
 
The problems with this kind of potentiality argument are notorious, and it is unfair to suggest 
that Nozick would endorse such a fallacious argument without reference to his work. Without 
LURQ\ /DFH\ JRHV RQ WR VD\ FULWLFLVLQJ 1R]LFN¶V FRQVLGHUDWLRQ RI K\SHU-intelligent extra-
terrestrials (whom Nozick suggests might have certain rights over humans), WKDW D ³PHUH
increase in intelligence, moral insights or sensitivity, however vast, would surely not justify 
sacrificing XV IRU WKHLU SXUSRVHV :H GR QRW VDFULILFH FKLOGUHQ RU LPEHFLOHV IRU RXU RZQ´
(2001, 29). Lacey is correct on this latter point, but we do sacrifice NHAs, anG 1R]LFN¶V
political philosophy as presented must ± begrudgingly ± permit this. More likely than Nozick 
endorsing flawed potentiality arguments is that, as indicated in his arguments for 
veg(etari)anism, he believed that NHAs and human infants are owed protection in their own 
right, thanks WR WKHLU LQKHUHQWYDOXH WKHIDFW WKDW WKH\FRXQW IRU³VRPHWKLQJ´7KLV WKRXJK
1R]LFN ILQGV GLIILFXOW WR DUWLFXODWH 5HFDOO KRZ KH VDLG WKDW WKH ³WKLFNHW RI TXHVWLRQV´
VXUURXQGLQJWKHLVVXHRI1+$V³GDXQWV´KLP 
Vallentyne correctly observes that if Nozick holds that all rights are choice-protecting, 
which it seems that he does, he owes an account demonstrating that there are no interest-
protecting rights. TKHUHLVQRDWWHPSWDWVXFKDGHPRQVWUDWLRQLQ1R]LFN¶VFRUSXV9DOOHQW\QH
2011, 149). Vallentyne recognises that choice-protecting rights do not and cannot extend to 
NHAs and infants, and accurately links the two groups (2011, 145-6, 149). Despite this, he 
does not mention any exclusion of infants IURP1R]LFN¶VULJKWV-framework, though he does 
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stress an exclusion of NHAs. Vallentyne assumes that Nozick includes babies in his system 
of rights, presumably because they possess interest-protecting rights, while reading him as 
excluding NHAs. It is not clear why Vallentyne, after recognising the parallels in the two 
cases, should separate them without argument. It is true that Nozick sometimes writes as if he 
is opposed to attributing rights to NHAs, perhaps because he does not want to come across as 
³H[WUHPH´ or D³FUDQN´FINozick 1981, 523; Nozick 1997, 305-6), but at the same time, he 
seemingly wants to offer them (and infants) protection. Embracing interest rights seems to be 
one of the few options open to Nozick, unless he wishes to go down a rather dark path. 
This alternative route is taken by Narveson. He is, like Nozick, a libertarian, and takes 
significant influence from the latter (especially in his earlier libertarian work). However, he 
takes an explicitly neo-+REEHVLDQ FRQWUDFWDULDQ SRVLWLRQ ZKLFK FRQWUDVWV ZLWK 1R]LFN¶V 
commitment to a political theory informed by morality. The significance of this will become 
clear. Narveson is of the view that those who wish to harm NHAs sKRXOGQRW³KDYHWRVXEPLW
to the self-DVFULEHGµPRUDO¶PLQLVWUDWLRQVRIWKRVHZKRZDQWWRPDNHWKHPFKDUWHUPHPEHUV
RIWKHPRUDOUHSXEOLF´, and holds that if it is in our interests to treat NHAs well, 
WKHQZHVKRXOGEXWLIQRW³ZK\VKRXld we JRWRWKHWURXEOH"´, 41-2).9 In this sense, 
Narveson has advanced no further than Thomas Hobbes; both exclude NHAs from the 
domain of the political because of their assumed inability to enter any kind of contractual 
relationship.10 Martha Nussbaum is right when she observes that  
 
³>7@he urgent need to undermine the basis of monarchical and hierarchical 
conceptions of politics explained and to a great extent justified the decision to 
focus on those human beings who are roughly equal in power and resources 
[in Hobbes]. We do not live in the same world now; and we have no such 
excuse for not facing [issues of inclusion in justice] head on, in the course of 
designing basic political principles.´ (2006, 32) 
 
Narveson, however, does not stop at the exclusion of NHAs. Those same reasons which are 
used to exclude NHAs apply to many humans. Narveson writes that DQ\ ³EDVLV IRU WKH
                                                          
9
 A broadly similar position is taken by Machan. He is opposed to intervention of the government into the life of 
humans for anything perceived as a moralistic reason; governments exist solely to protect human rights, and not 
IRU³DQLPDOZHOIDUH´0DFKDQGRHV seem to believe that there are moral constraints on our 
treatment of NHAs, but this is a separate question to whether they have rights, which, he claims, they do not 
(1985, 75; 1991, 164; 2004, 20-1, 118). Consequently, and though Machan sometimes seems nervous of his own 
conclusion (2004, 22), there should not be any direct legal protection of NHAs. 
10
 For more on Hobbesian contractariaQLVPVHH0DUN5RZODQGV¶VFRQWULEXWLRQWRWKHSUHVHQWYROXPH 
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REMHFWLRQWRFUXHOWUHDWPHQW´RI1+$V³LVVXUHO\V\PSDWK\MXVWDVLWLVIRURXUGHDOLQJVZLWK
KXPDQ LQIDQWV´   7KH FDSDFLWLHV ZKLFK JUDQW DQ LQGLYLGXDO ULJKWs, Narveson 
FODLPVDUH³SHUIHFWO\IDPLOLDUWRDQ\DGXOWRUDQ\FKLOGEH\RQGLQIDQF\´WKRXJK
presumably not to infants. In fact, Narveson elsewhere denies that they are familiar to all 
adults. Though implausibly claiming WKDW³>H@YHQYHU\ UHWDUGHGKXPDQEHLQJV«DUH IDU LQ
DGYDQFH RI HYHQ EULJKW DQLPDOV´ intellectually (1987, 32), he denies that there can be any 
³LQKHUHQW YDOXH´ LQ ³JUHDWO\ VXEQRUPDO KXPDQV RU LQIDQWV´ , 39). His ethico-political 
IUDPHZRUN³PXVWRIFRXUVHFODVVLI\WKRVH humans who are so far below the standard for our 
VSHFLHV « DV QRW LQKHUHQWO\ TXDOLILHG IRU EDVLF ULJKWV´ , 46). 7KLV OHDYHV 1DUYHVRQ¶V
state a dystopic vision. He endorses the use of NHAs ± for food, entertainment, science and 
so forth ± currently standard, and is opposed to the minimal regulation that these industries 
receive. However, he must also endorse the possibility that certain humans may be used in 
these ways. His vision is one which, surely, we must reject. 
 Susan Okin sees 1R]LFN¶V state DV VLPLODUO\ G\VWRSLF 6KH VXJJHVWV WKDW 1R]LFN¶V
commitments to self-ownership and derivative property rights lead to the conclusion that 
humans are owned by their mothers (1989, 81- 1R]LFN VKH VXJJHVWV H[FOXGHV ³LQIDQWV
small children, and many of WKHGHYHORSPHQWDOO\GLVDEOHG´IURPWKHGRPDLQRIULJKWV-bearers 
(1989, 85)2NLQLPDJLQHVDZRUOGLQZKLFKDZRPDQPLJKWSURGXFH³DFKLOGIRUZKDWHYHU
purpose she chooses´IRUVDOH, ³to keep it [sic@LQDFDJHWRDPXVHKHU«RUHYHQWRNLOOLWDQG
eat it, LIVKHZHUHVRLQFOLQHG´ 
 It is my contention that Nozick does not want to take this path, as concerns humans or 
NHAs. That Nozick should be concerned with respect for all ± regardless of whether beings 
are able to reciprocate respect ± can in part be traced back to the moral foundations of his 
politics. The argument of ASU is motivated by 1R]LFN¶Vfoundational assumption that some 
things are deeply unjust ³,QGLYLGXDOV KDYH ULJKWV DQG WKHUH DUH WKLQJV QR SHUVRQ RU JURXS
PD\ GR WR WKHP´  ix). These things are wrong regardless of whether we live in the 
state, and regardless of whether treating them as wrong is in our interests. 1DUYHVRQ¶V
Hobbesian framework, however, is motivated by egoism and self-protection. For this reason, 
Nozick will always be uneasy about following the Narvesonian path ± at least when he feels 
that there is something deeply wrong about inflicting significant, direct harms upon young 
children and NHAs, which he clearly does. 
In order to take the alternative path, in which respect for NHAs and all humans is a 
demand of justice, Nozick needs to extend rights to those beings who lack the capacity to 
meaningfully possess choice rights. The most suitable way to do this would be to endorse the 
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extension of interest rights to these beings. Precisely how these interest rights would look is 
QRW VRPHWKLQJ WKDW FDQ EH UHDG IURP 1R]LFN¶V ZRUN ± as Vallentyne has observed, Nozick 
does not consider interest rights in his published material at all. Perhaps if he had, he would 
have been able to make greater sense of how his views of NHAs fit in with his wider political 
philosophy, and may have been able to offer a political animal ethics more satisfying ± to him 
and to animal ethicists ± than hLV ³WRR PLQLPDO´ PD[LP RI ³XWLOLWDULDQLVP IRU DQLPDOV
.DQWLDQLVPIRUSHRSOH´ 
In suggesting that Nozick could extend interest rights to NHAs, I am essentially 
suggesting that Nozick could temper his libertarianism, but temper his libertarianism in a way 
consistent with other claims he makes. It is not uncommon for critics (e.g., Fried 2011) to 
claim that Nozick dulls the edge of his libertarianism with non-libertarian elements, even in 
ASU. Nozick himself later accepted that his political theory as presented in ASU was 
³LQDGHTXDWH´IRUIDLOLQJWRWDNHLQWRDFFRXQWWKHV\PEROLFXWLOLW\RIDFWLRQVWKRXJK
he did not recant libertarianism (Sanchez 2001). This allows for a number of ways in which 
we might understaQGWKHSRVVLELOLW\RILQWHUHVWULJKWVLQ1R]LFN¶VWKRXJKWILUVWKLVFRPPHQWV
on NHAs in ASU may indicate that, even in 1974, Nozick did not buy into his own 
libertarianism. Second, his dissatisfaction with the full consequences of libertarianism in his 
more developed thought may indicate that animal rights is an aspect that he would, could or 
should have endorsed in his later life, even while holding fast to an (otherwise) broadly 
libertarian worldview. A third, unsympathetic, possibility would be that Nozick was highly 
inconsistent in his political commitments, and that his mixed messages on animal rights are 
one element of this. On this third reading, there would be no way to mediate between Nozick-
the-consistent-libertarian and Nozick-the-latent-animal-rightist. 
 
Possible objections 
I will now offer brief responses to four possible worries about my presentation of Nozickian 
politics as potentially sympathetic to NHAs. 
The first issue is the minimal state. A state with the power and mandate to enforce the 
rights-claims of NHAs would be larger than the state typically associated with Nozick. 
However, the requirement for a larger-than-expected state is not a reason for a Nozickian to 
reject animal rights. If the demands of justice require a large state, Nozick is prepared to 
accept this; a point not lost on commentators. ,Q ZKDW %HUQDUG :LOOLDPV FDOOV ³D YLWDOO\
LPSRUWDQWEXWXQHPSKDWLFSDVVDJH´-6) of ASU, for example, Nozick professes that 
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he is open to a redistributive state as a means of rectifying historical injustices (1974, 230-1). 
Similarly, Joachim Wündisch (2014; cf. Waldron 2005) has recently argued that Nozickian 
minarchism necessitates a welfare state ± something often seen as anathema to libertarianism. 
The second issue is that Nozick is often presented as an advocate of unrestrained 
capitalism, and capitalism is frequently portrayed as a bad thing for NHAs. I do not deny that, 
as currently practiced, capitalism is bad for NHAs, but this does not mean that we are 
obliged to overthrow it. Nozickianism has tools for constraining the free market, including, 
but not limited to, rights. To put it simply, if NHAs have rights, then much of what is done to 
them under capitalism should be prevented by the state. This means that a Nozickian can 
condemn the rights-violations inflicted by capitalists, and those industries in which the rights-
violations are inherent, without having to condemn capitalism itself. In this sense, a 
Nozickian picture of animal rights is not far from a liberal picture of animal rights. It is also 
worth remembering that the left, too, has a long history of opposition to animal rights, and 
real-world socialist states have hardly been utopias for NHAs (Donaldson and Kymlicka 
2014). 
Third, though I have illustrated that Nozickian politics is potentially open to animal 
rights, I may have done this by showing that Nozick is not truly a libertarian.11 If the truly 
libertarian position is more like 1DUYHVRQ¶V WKHQ WKLV OHDYHV libertarianism undesirable for 
animal ethicists (and many other thinkers). Even this, however, would not mean that animal 
ethics and libertarianism should have only an antagonistic relationship, as there is potential 
for the exploration of how libertarian-inspired tools might enrich animal ethics or be 
applicable to NHAs. Work in this area has already begun: Rainer Ebert and Tibor Machan 
write DERXW ³OLEHUWDULDQL]LQJ´ ULJKWV WKHRU\ DV LW LV DSSOLHG LQ DQLPDO HWKLFV  -RKQ
Hadley explores the attribution of Lockean-inspired property rights to NHAs (2015, chap. 3) 
and I argue WKDW1R]LFN¶V ³/RFNHDQ´SURYLVR FDQEHXVHG WRRIIHU VLJQLILFDQW protection to 
NHAs (2014). It is possible that this work represents the most valuable contributions that 
libertarian theory can offer to animal ethics; rather than adopting a libertarian theory of 
animal rights wholesale, animal ethicists may be able to draw tools from libertarian theory to 
help deal with particular problems. 
This ties to a fourth problem: it is possible that animal ethicists reject Nozickian 
politics for reasons unrelated to its treatment of animal rights. To be clear, I have sympathy 
with many criticisms of Nozick, and, in exploring his work here, I do not wish to be read as 
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 0\IRFXVKDVEHHQRQ1R]LFN¶VIRXQGDWLRnal question of rights-possession rather than his entitlement theory, 
when, arguably, it is the latter element of his thought which is ³most´ libertarian. 
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endorsing libertarianism. However, once again, we can point to the normative tools which 
Nozickian/libertarian philosophy contains; these are ideas which could be taken from their 
libertarian context and applied elsewhere. In addition, there is value, especially for liberal 
animal ethicists, in demonstrating the possibility of a broad consensus for animal rights, even 
among theorists who might typically be considered hostile to the possibility. 
 
1R]LFN¶Vethics 
,Q P\ H[SORUDWLRQ RI 1R]LFN¶V SROLWLFDO SKLORVRSK\, I have overlooked key aspects of 
1R]LFN¶V DQLPDO HWKLFV ,I WKH SRVVLELOLW\ RI 1R]LFNLDQ DQLPDO ULJKWV LV UHMHFWHG 1R]LFN¶V 
arguments for Western vegetarianism would be solely moral, but this would not mean that his 
animal ethics should be ignored. In both The Examined Life and Philosophical Explanations, 
1R]LFN FRQVLGHUV 1+$V ZLWKLQ KLV ³RUJDQLF XQLW\´-based axiology (1981, 415-9, 440-4; 
2006, 162-6). He thereby offers a principled way of justifying his (intuitionistic) claim in 
ASU that NHAs count for ³something´. Organic unity is an idea from aesthetics, wherein a 
work of art can be judged valuable based on the extent to which it unifies disparate elements 
(themes, media, colours), and the extent to which the unified elements were, originally, 
disparate. This same method, Nozick claims, can be used to judge value in any field (Nozick 
1981, 415-6), with more organically unified entities being more valuable. The judgement is a 
two-part one: ³>W@KHJUHDWHUWKHGLYHUVLW\WKDWJHWVXQLILHGWKHJUHDWHUWKHRUJDQLFXQLW\DQG
also the tighter the unity to which the diveUVLW\ LV EURXJKW WKH JUHDWHU WKH RUJDQLF XQLW\´
(Nozick 2006, 164). 
When the principle is applied, ³we can rank organisms roughly in accordance with 
their degree of organic unity, so that most plants come below most animals, with higher 
animals coming above the lower ones´ (Nozick 1981, 417). Paradigmatic humans are placed 
DERYH1+$VDV³>V@HQWLHQFHDQGWKHQFRQVFLRXVQHVVDGGQHZSRVVLELOLWLHVRIXQLILFDWLRQRYHU 
time and at a time, and self-FRQVFLRXVQHVV EHLQJ DQ µ,¶ LV DQ HVSHFLDOO\ WLJKW PRGH RI
XQLILFDWLRQ´ (1981, 416-7; cf. 2006, 163) 7KLV PHDQV WKDW ³WKH UDQNLQJ RI RUJDQLVPV LQ
accordance with degree of organic unity matches our value ranking of them, with people 
DERYH RWKHU DQLPDOV DERYH SODQWV DERYH URFNV´ (1981, 417), though there is potential for 
overlap (1981, 415). 
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NHAs are, then, of fairly considerable value ± though some are more valuable than 
others.12 The high value of NHAs takes on particular significance when it comes to the 
human desire to live a meaningful life. This is because, to repeat, human lives become 
meaningful by connecting with things of value. Importantly, however, individuals must 
respond appropriately to these entities of value (Nozick 1981, 428-33; Nozick 2006, chap. 
14). We do not, for example, make our lives more meaningful by responding with disgust to 
things of beauty. Instead, we might admire valuable art or protect valuable ecosystems, or we 
could derive some meaning from having the appropriate disvaluing attitudes towards 
disvaluable things;13 we can be angry at injustice, disgusted by wastefulness. The way that 
our lifestyles might demand the death and suffering of NHAs, or the denial of their freedom, 
must ± at least when as transparently unnecessary as it is in the West ± indicate that we have 
the wrong kinds of attitudes towards them qua beings of value; this, in turn, makes our lives 
less meaningful. It is not by killing, overpowering or hurting NHAs that we make our life 
meaningful, but by admiring them, respecting them, or ± when appropriate ± aiding them.14 
Following this to its conclusion, we see that, ceteris paribus, the life of a vegan is more 
meaningful than the life of a non-YHJDQRQ1R]LFN¶VSLFWXUH7R UHLWHUDWHKRZHYHUSHRSOH
must freely choose to engage appropriately with things of (dis)value. Their lives are not made 
meaningful if they are forced to engage appropriately with them.  
7KLVSLFWXUHRIWKHSODFHRI1+$VLQ1R]LFN¶VSKLORVRSK\is neatly tied together in his 
four levels of ethics (2001, 260-2; 2006, 212-4). It is important to be moral ± ³EHLQJPRUDO
instances and realizes a more general kind of valXHDQG\RXVKRXOGEHPRUDOEHFDXVHLWLV«
DEHWWHUZD\WREH´ (2001, 283) ± but the only thing we can do with a person who refuses to 
EHKDYH PRUDOO\ LV WR WU\ WR DSSHDO WR WKHLU EHWWHU VLGH ³$OO WKDW DQ\ VRFLHW\ VKRXOG
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 Exploring this fully is beyond the scope of the present chapter. Nozick claims that the means of judging 
RUJDQLFXQLW\ZLOOYDU\LQGLIIHUHQW³UHDOPV´, so in reality offers a kind of meta-axiology. When 
it comes, however, tR WKH ³UHDOP´ RI DQLPDOV ± human and otherwise ± he seems to think, as indicated, that 
organic unity is grounded primarily in mental sophistication. Mental sophistication will perhaps not always win 
out, however, with Nozick claiming that a redwood is more valuable than a mouse (1981, 415). Simon 
Hailwood suggests that this could be justified by the age and size of the tree (1996, 150); though the mouse wins 
on the primary measure of organic unity, the tree wins on others. Also possible is that Nozick is mistaken. The 
PRXVHFRXOGEHPRUHRUJDQLFDOO\XQLILHGRUSHUKDSVWKHWUHHDQGWKHPRXVHDUHRIQRWRIWKHVDPH³UHDOP´ ± 
Nozick problematically assumes that they are ± meaning that their value could even be incomparable. Though 
cross-realm comparisons of value are sometimes possible, they are not always (Nozick 1981, 419). 
13
 Disvaluable things are those entities with a destructive telos (Nozick 1981, 419). This need not mean ± a point 
Lacey seems to miss (2001, 81) ± that telos LVHVVHQWLDOWR1R]LFN¶VPHWDShysics or applicable LQDOO³UHDOPV´. 
While the concentration camp is disvaluable (Nozick 1981, 419), the volcano need not be. Nozick takes this 
disanalogy for granted (Hailwood 1996, 154). 
14
 Nozick talks of V verbs (support, respect, affirm, etc.) and anti-V verbs (neglect, dismiss, destroy, etc.). We 
act ethically, and give meaning to our lives, when we V those things of value and anti-V those things of 
disvalue. 
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(coercively) demand is adherence to [the first level]. The further levels should be a matter for 
DSHUVRQ¶VRZQLQGLYLGXDOFKRLFHDQGGHYHORSPHQW´ (2001, 281-2). The first level is the ethics 
of respect, and ultimately concerns respect for the negative rights of autonomous adults. The 
principles of ASU are one way to work this out, and another (a kind of naturalistic, 
HYROXWLRQDU\ HWKLF LV RIIHUHG LQ 1R]LFN¶V Invariances (2001, 280, 248-78). NHAs, unless 
Nozickian animal rights can be grounded, are excluded. 
1R]LFN¶VVHFRQGOHYHOLVWKHethics of responsiveness, described variously as an ethic 
ZKLFK³PDQGDWHVDFWLQJLQDZD\WKDWLVUHVSRQVLYHWRRWKHUSHRSOH¶VUHDOLW\DQGYDOXHDZD\
WKDWWDNHVDFFRXQWRIWKHLUUHDOLW\DQGLVLQWULFDWHO\FRQWRXUHGWRLW´ (2006, 212) and as about 
³DFWLQJ LQ D ZD\ WKDW LV UHVSRQVLYH WR SHRSOH¶V YDOXH HQKDQFLQJ DQG VXSSRUWLQJ LW DQG
HQDEOLQJ LW WR IORXULVK´ (2001, 280). Why Nozick here specifies only the value of people is 
unclear; he certainly does not justify it. Given that ± as established ± many NHAs are beings 
RIFRQVLGHUDEOHYDOXHLQ1R]LFN¶VD[LRORJ\ WKHUHLVQRUHDVRQWKDW WKH\VKRXOGEHH[FOXGHG
from the ethics of responsiveness. When Nozick speaks of his own vegetarianism, it is the 
language of responsiveness (or, perhaps clumsily, respect) WKDWKHXVHV ³$UHVSHFW IRUDQG
valuing of animal life leads me not to eat meat or fish and to try to avoid wearing animal 
SURGXFWV´ (1981, 523). I suggest that a fully worked-out ethics of respect would include not 
merely people, but NHAs.15 
,Q1R]LFN¶Vown description of the four levels of ethics, it is in the third level that 
NHAs explicitly enter. The ethics of caring ZKHQ IXOO\ GHYHORSHG PDQGDWH ³QRQKDUP
ahimsa DQG ORYH WR DOO SHRSOH SHUKDSV WR DOO OLYLQJ FUHDWXUHV´   7KH HWKLFV RI
caring is a long way from any kind of political prescription. In its demand for positive 
attitudes, the ethic speaks to individuals about how they should feel; even the actions of the 
individual seem secondary. (The fourth layer of ethics, the ethics of light, is reached only by 
great spiritual leaders; Socrates, Buddha, Jesus. What it mandates, if anything in particular, is 
unclear.) 
Nozick, then, is able to offer coherent, original arguments for the value of NHAs, and 
present both an ethical framework and an account of the meaning of life in which respect for 
NHAs finds a comfortable place. This should perhaps not be surprising. Nozick, as well as 
being one of the most original philosophers of the 20th century, was a vegetarian, and devoted 
                                                          
15
 Nozick writes that he is cRQFHUQHGZLWKH[SORULQJ³WKHIXOOHVWPRUDOEDVLV´IRURXUWUHDWPHQWRIRWKHUEHLQJV
meaning that, in practice, he focuses on humans. He is explicit, though, that this focus does not mean that he 
denies that NHAs might be owed certain kinds of respectful treatment (1981, 451). This may be the reason that 
HYHQ WKRVH FRPPHQWDWRUV ZKR ORRN WR 1R]LFN¶V HWKLFV HJ, Hailwood 1996, chaps. 11-3) downplay his 
comments on NHAs. 
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several pages in his first and most important book to explaining (with simple, intuitive, 
compelling arguments) that all in the West should be too. Even if ± which I deny ± his 
politics must be hostile to NHAs, perhaps it is time that Nozick is recognised as deserving of 
a place in our minds among the morally-focussed animal ethicists of the 20th century. 
 
Concluding remarks 
The political turn in animal ethics should expand its reach and potential by looking to 
political philosophy beyond liberalism. Right libertarianism has been almost entirely ignored 
by animal ethicists, and right libertarian philosophers have been highly critical of animal 
rights. Nonetheless, Robert Nozick, the most prominent right libertarian, should be 
recognised as a novel and interesting, if cautious, animal ethicist. Even if we might have 
UHDVRQWRQRWHQGRUVH1R]LFN¶VSKLORVRSK\, it would be a mistake to simply ignore it. It is my 
hope that the political turn in animal ethics will allow not just new and novel approaches to 
animal ethics, but reassessments of existing political theories and influential thinkers. 
1R]LFN¶VUHDVVHVVPHQWLVLQP\YLHZORQJRYHUGXH 
 
Bibliography 
Arneson, R.  µSide Constraints, Lockean Individual Rights, and the Moral Basis of 
/LEHUWDULDQLVP¶ in The Cambridge &RPSDQLRQ WR 1R]LFN¶V $QDUFK\ 6WDWH DQG
Utopia, R. Bader and J. Meadowcroft, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 15-
37. 
Bader, R. (2010) Robert Nozick, London: Continuum. 
Dombrowski, D. (1997) Babies and Beasts, Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press. 
Donaldson, S., Kymlicka, W. (2013) Zoopolis, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Donaldson, S., Kymlicka, W. (2014) µAnimal Rights, Multiculturalism, and the Left¶, 
Journal of Social Philosophy, 45, 116-35. 
Ebert, R., Machan, T. (2012) µInnocent Threats and the Moral Problem of Carnivorous 
Animals¶, Journal of Applied Philosophy, 29, 146-59. 
Francione, G., Charlton, A. (2013) Eat Like You Care. Logan, UT: Exempla Press. 
18 
 
 
Fried, B. (2011) µDoes Nozick Have a Theory of Property Rights?¶ in The Cambridge 
&RPSDQLRQ WR 1R]LFN¶V $QDUFK\ 6WDWH DQG 8WRSLD, edited by R. Bader and J. 
Meadowcroft, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 230-52. 
Garner, R. (2013) A Theory of Justice for Animals, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Hadley, J. (2015) Animal Property Rights, London: Lexington Books. 
Hailwood, S. (1996) Exploring Nozick, Aldershot, England: Avebury. 
+RUWD 2  µThe Scope of the Argument from Species Overlap¶, Journal of Applied 
Philosophy, 31, 142-54. 
-RKQVRQ .  µGovernment by Insurance Company: The Antipolitical Philosophy of 
Robert Nozick¶, Western Political Quarterly, 29, 177-88. 
Lacey, A. R. (2001) Robert Nozick, Durham, England: Acumen. 
Lomasky, L. (1987) Persons, Rights, and the Moral Community, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Lomasky, L.  µ,V LW:URQJ WR(DW$QLPDOV"¶ Social Philosophy and Policy, 30: 177-
200. 
Machan, T. µSRPH'RXEWV$ERXW$QLPDO5LJKWV¶ Journal of Value Enquiry 19, 73-5. 
Machan, T. µDo Animals Have Rights?¶ Public Affairs Quarterly, 5, 163-73. 
Machan, T. (2004) Putting Humans First, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. 
McMahan, J. (2002) The Ethics of Killing, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
0F0DKDQ-µChallenges to Human Equality¶, Journal of Ethics, 12, 81-104. 
0LOOLJDQ7µThe Political Turn in Animal Rights¶ Politics and Animals, 1, 6±15. 
0LOEXUQ-µ7KH'HPDQGLQJQHVVRI1R]LFN¶V³/RFNHDQ´ PURYLVR¶ European Journal 
of Political Theory, OnlineFirst, 1-17. 
0LOEXUQ -  µAnimal Rights and Food: Beyond Regan, Beyond Vegan¶ in The 
Routledge Handbook of Food Ethics, edited by M. Rawlinson, London: Routledge. 
19 
 
 
1DJHO 7  µLibertarianism Without Foundations¶, in J. Paul (ed), Reading Nozick, 
Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 191-205. 
1DUYHVRQ-µAnimal Rights¶, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 7, 161-78. 
Narveson, J. (1987µOn a Case for Animal Rights¶, The Monist, 70, 31-49. 
Narveson, J. (1999) Moral Matters, Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview. 
Nozick, R. (1974) Anarchy, State and Utopia, New York: Basic Books. 
Nozick, R. (1981) Philosophical Explanations, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Nozick, R  1RYHPEHU  µAbout Mammals and People¶, New York Times Book 
Review, 11. 
Nozick, R. (1993). The Nature of Rationality, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Nozick, R. (1997) Socratic Puzzles, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Nozick, R. (2001) Invariances, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Nozick, R. (2006) The Examined Life, New York: Simon & Schuster. 
Nussbaum, M. (2006) Frontiers of Justice, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Okin, S. (1989) Justice, Gender, and the Family, New York: Basic Books. 
Pluhar, E. (1995) Beyond Prejudice, Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 
Rachels, J. (1990) Created From Animals, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Regan, T. (1983) The Case for Animal Rights, Oakland, CA: University of California Press. 
6DQFKH] -  µ$Q ,QWHUYLHZ ZLWK 5REHUW 1R]LFN¶ DYDLODEOH DW
http://www.juliansanchez.com/an-interview-with-robert-nozick-july-26-2001/  
Singer, P. (1975) Animal Liberation, New York: HarperCollins. 
9DOOHQW\QH 3  µ1R]LFN¶V /LEHUWDULDQ 7KHRU\ RI -XVWLFH¶, in The Cambridge 
&RPSDQLRQ WR 1R]LFN¶V $QDUFK\ 6WDWH DQG 8WRSLD, edited by in R. Bader and J. 
Meadowcroft, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 145-67. 
20 
 
 
:DOGURQ-µNozick and Locke: Filling the Space of Rights¶, Social Philosophy and 
Policy, 22, 81-110. 
:LOOLDPV%  µThe Minimal State¶ LQ Reading Nozick, edited in by J. Paul, Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell, 27-36. 
:LVVHQEXUJ 0  µAn Agenda for Animal Political Theory¶, in Animal Politics and 
Political Animals, edited by M. Wissenburg and D. Schlosberg, Basingstoke, 
England: Palgrave Macmillan, 30-43. 
Wolff, J. (2003) Robert Nozick, Cambridge: Polity. 
Wündisch, J. (2014) Towards a Right-Libertarian Welfare State, Münster, Germany: Mentis. 
